Full Citation in the ACM Digital Library
Accepted papers
The following papers has been selected to appear at WPES 2019:
Full papers
- Anonymity and Privacy in Bitcoin Escrow Trades
Farida Sabry (Qatar University); Wadha Labda (Qatar University); Aiman Erbad (Qatar University); Qutaibah Malluhi (Qatar University) - There Are 10 Types of Vectors (and Polynomials): Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs of “One-Hotness” via Polynomials with One Zero
Ryan Henry (University of Calgary); William Black (University of Calgary) - How Much Does GenoGuard Really Guard? An Empirical Analysis of Long-Term Security for Genomic Data
Bristena Oprisanu (University College London); Christophe Dessimoz (UNIL); Emiliano De Cristofaro (University College London) - Ancile: Enhancing Privacy for Ubiquitous Computing with Use-Based Privacy
Eugene Bagdasaryan (Cornell University); Griffin Berlstein (Vassar College); Jason Waterman (Vassar College); Eleanor Birrell (Pomona College); Nate Foster (Cornell University); Fred B. Schneider (Cornell University); Deborah Estrin (Cornell University) - Privacy-Preserving Multi-Party Access Control
Mina Sheikhalishahi (Eindhoven University of Technology), Gamze Tillem (Delft University of Technology), Zekeriya Erkin (Delft University of Technology) and Nicola Zannone (Eindhoven University of Technology) - End-to-End Secure Mobile Group Messaging with Conversation Integrity and Deniability
Michael Schliep (University of Minnesota); Nicholas Hopper (University of Minnesota) - Private Set Intersection with Linear Communication from General Assumptions
Daniel Noble (University of Pennsylvania); Brett Hemenway Falk (University of Pennsylvania); Rafail Ostrovsky (University of California) - Efficiently Stealing your Machine Learning Models
Robert Nikolai Reith (TU Darmstadt); Oleksandr Tkachenko (TU Darmstadt); Thomas Schneider (TU Darmstadt) - A Simulation-based Approach to Privacy Education
Kambiz Ghazinour (Kent State University); Ken Messner (Kent State University); Sean Scarnecchia (Kent State University); David Selinger (Kent State University) - Anatomy of Commercial IMSI Catchers and Detectors
Shinjo Park (TU Berlin); Altaf Shaik (TU Berlin); Ravishankar Borgaonkar (SINTEF Digital); Jean-Pierre Seifert (TU Berlin) - MagneticSpy: Exploiting Magnetometer in Mobile Devices for Website and Application Fingerprinting
Nikolay Matyunin (TU Darmstadt); Yujue Wang (TU Darmstadt); Tolga Arul (TU Darmstadt); Kristian Kullmann (TU Darmstadt); Jakub Szefer (Yale University); Stefan Katzenbeisser (University of Passau) - DURASIFT A robust, decentralized, encrypted database supporting private searches with complex policy-controls
Brett Hemenway (University of Pennsylvania); Rafail Ostrovsky (University of California); Steve Lu (Stealth Software) - State of the Sandbox: Investigating macOS Application Security
Maximilian Blochberger (University of Hamburg); Jakob Rieck (University of Hamburg); Christian Burkert (University of Hamburg); Tobias Mueller (University of Hamburg); Hannes Federrath (University of Hamburg) - Can Privacy Nudges be Tailored to Individuals' Decision Making and Personality Traits?
Logan Warberg (Carnegie Mellon University); Alessandro Acquisti (Carnegie Mellon University); Douglas Sicker (Carnegie Mellon University)
Short papers
- Parking tickets for privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking
Ricard Borges (Universitat de Lleida); Francesc Sebé (Universitat de Lleida) - Privacy Protection in Distributed Fingerprint-based Authentication
Swe Geng (ETH Zurich); Georgia Giannopoulou (ABB Switzerland Ltd); Maëlle Kabir-Querrec (ABB Switzerland Ltd) - Balancing Security and Privacy in Genomic Range Queries
Ercan Ozturk (University of California); Xuhua Ding (SMU); Gene Tsudik (University of California) - zksk: A Library for Composable Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Wouter Lueks (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne); Bogdan Kulynych (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne); Jules Fasquelle (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne); Simon Le Bail-Collet (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) - When Certificate Transparency Is Too Transparent: Analyzing Information Leakage in HTTPS Domain Names
Richard Roberts (University of Maryland); Dave Levin (University of Maryland)