

# Privacy-preserving Loyalty Programs

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**Abstract.** Loyalty programs are promoted by vendors to incentivize loyalty in buyers. Although such programs have become widespread, they have been criticized by business experts and consumer associations: loyalty results in profiling and hence in loss of privacy of consumers. We propose a protocol for privacy-preserving loyalty programs that allows vendors and consumers to enjoy the benefits of loyalty (returning customers and discounts, respectively), while allowing consumers to stay anonymous and empowering them to decide how much of their profile they reveal to the vendor. The vendor must offer additional reward if he wants to learn more details on the consumer's profile. Our protocol is based on partially blind signatures and generalization techniques, and provides anonymity to consumers and their purchases, while still allowing negotiated consumer profiling.

**Keywords:** Loyalty programs, customer privacy, anonymization, blind signatures, e-cash.

## 1 Introduction

Loyalty programs are marketing efforts implemented by vendors, especially retailers, that are aimed at establishing a lasting relationship with consumers. In a loyalty program, the vendor pursues two main goals: i) to encourage the consumer to make more purchases in the future (returning customer); ii) to allow the vendor to profile the consumer in view of conducting market research and segmentation (profiled customer). In order to lure consumers into a loyalty program, the vendor offers them rewards, typically loyalty points that consumers can later exchange for discounts, gifts or other benefits offered by the vendor. Normally, enrollment to loyalty programs involves some kind of registration procedure, in which customers fill out a form with their personal information and are granted a loyalty card, be it a physical card (magnetic stripe or smartcard) or a smartphone application.

Market analysis and client segmentation are carried out by building profiles of individual customers based on their personal information, which customers supply to the vendor during enrollment to the loyalty program, and their purchase records, collected every time customers present their loyalty cards. The profiles thus assembled are used in marketing actions, such as market studies and targeted advertising.

Although loyalty programs have become widespread, they are experiencing a loss of active participants and they have been criticized by business experts and consumer associations. Criticism is mainly due to privacy issues, because it is not always clear whether the benefits vendors offer in their loyalty programs are worth the loss of consumer privacy caused by profiling [15,17,7,9].

Loyalty programs can offer clear advantages to both vendors and consumers, like returning customers and special discounts, respectively. However, privacy concerns regarding buyer profiling affect more and more the acceptance of such programs, as the public awareness on the dangers of personal information disclosure is increasing.

### 1.1 Contribution and plan of this paper

In this work we propose a protocol for privacy-preserving loyalty programs that allows vendors and consumers to enjoy the benefits of loyalty, while preserving the anonymity of consumers and empowering them to decide how accurately they reveal their profile to the vendor. In order to encourage customers not just to return but also to disclose more of their profile, the vendor must offer additional rewards to consumers. Thus, vendors *pay* consumers for their private information. On the other hand, consumers become aware of how much their personal data are worth to vendors, and they can decide to what extent they are ready to reveal such data in exchange for what benefits.

To empower consumers as described above, we provide them with a mechanism that allows them to profile themselves, generalize their profiles and submit these generalized profiles to the vendor in an anonymous way. There are some technical challenges to be overcome:

- The proposed mechanism should prevent vendors from linking the generalized profiles to the identity of buyers, to particular transactions or to particular loyalty points submitted for redemption.
- To prevent straightforward profiling by the vendor, payment should be anonymous. In online stores, to completely achieve anonymity, the buyers should use some kind of anonymous payment system, such as

- Bitcoin [13], Zerocoin [12], some other form of electronic cash [6], or simply scratch cards with prepaid credit anonymously bought, say, at a newsstand. In physical stores, it would be enough to pay with cash.
- Consumers should not be able to leverage their anonymity to reveal forged profiles to the vendor, which would earn them rewards without actually revealing anything on their real purchase pattern.

Our proposed mechanism, thus, needs to take care of the two main aspects of loyalty programs. First, it has to provide a way to obtain and submit loyalty points in an anonymous and unlinkable way; that is, a customer should be able to submit a particular loyalty point to a vendor, but the vendor should not be able to link that particular loyalty point to the transaction in which it was issued. Second, our mechanism must allow customers to build their own generalized profiles from their purchase history, but it must prevent customers to forge false profiles and vendors to link the generalized profiles to particular customers. We will show later that these two aspects can be tackled in a similar way.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a traditional loyalty program and presents the requirements and security properties our new protocol should satisfy. In Section 3 we introduce a cryptographic protocol based on partially blind signatures that is the basis of our proposed solution. Section 4 discusses a generalization strategy that our protocol will follow. In Section 5 we present our privacy-preserving loyalty program protocol. In Section 6 we analyze the performance of the system in terms of computation and communication complexity. Finally, Section 7 summarizes our conclusions and plans for future work.

## 2 Loyalty programs

Our method aims to offer all the functionalities of loyalty programs; that is, to allow vendors to reward returning customers with loyalty points and profile returning customers based on their purchase histories. The novelty is that our scheme empowers customers with the ability to decide how accurately they disclose their purchase histories to vendors.

A simple and perhaps the most widespread approach to implement a loyalty program is to have a centralized server, owned and operated by some vendor  $\mathcal{V}$ , that stores the information on the program participants. This information includes all the personal data the participants gave to the vendor when they enrolled to the program, their balance of loyalty points, and their history of purchases. Each customer is given a loyalty card which contains the identifier of her record in the server's

database. Each time a customer buys at a store and presents her loyalty card, her record in the server is updated, by adding to it the items she bought and modifying her balance of loyalty points if needed. In this way, all transactions by each customer can be linked to each other using the customer's identifier. Even if the customer provided false information when she enrolled to the loyalty program, all of her transactions would be linked anyway. Hence, discovering the customer's identity in one individual transaction (*e.g.* through the credit or debit card used for payment) would allow linking her entire profile to her real identity.

If control over profiling and purchase histories is to be left to customers, a centralized approach does not seem a good solution. Moreover, we should also ensure that individual transactions cannot be linked to each other unless desired by the customer. To do so, we will let each customer manage locally and anonymously her own balance of loyalty points and history of purchases.

## 2.1 A privacy-preserving alternative

Our proposed mechanism follows the decentralized approach. To allow local management of loyalty points and purchase receipts by the customer, we treat points and receipts as anonymous electronic cash that is issued by vendors and which can only be redeemed at the vendor who issued it. Moreover, the concrete implementation of the loyalty program should discourage customers from transferring loyalty points and purchase receipts among them. Purchase histories will be built by the vendor from the individual purchase receipts of all products purchased by each customer *that the customer allows the vendor to link together*; furthermore, the customer can decide how generalized/coarsened are the product descriptions in the purchase receipts she allows the vendor to link to one another.

Our proposed loyalty program protocol suite consists of the following procedures:

- **SETUP**. Algorithm run by some designated entity, which, on input a security parameter, outputs the parameters of the system. These parameters can be common to several vendors.
- **VENDORSETUP**. Protocol run by a vendor  $\mathcal{V}$  in which the specific loyalty program is set up. Also,  $\mathcal{V}$  obtains the public parameters of the system and a key pair.
- **ENROLL**. Protocol run by some customer  $\mathcal{C}$  whereby  $\mathcal{C}$  is given access to the loyalty program and the means to participate in it, typically a loyalty card or a smartphone application.

- **USE.** Interactive protocol run between some  $\mathcal{V}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$ , in which  $\mathcal{C}$  inputs the name of a product she wants to buy and obtains a purchase receipt which proves that  $\mathcal{C}$  has purchased the product from  $\mathcal{V}$ .
- **SUBMIT.** Interactive protocol run between some  $\mathcal{V}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$ , in which  $\mathcal{C}$  submits a list of possibly generalized purchase receipts to  $\mathcal{V}$ , in order to get loyalty points.
- **ISSUE.** Interactive protocol run between some  $\mathcal{V}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$ , in which  $\mathcal{C}$  obtains a certain amount of loyalty points.
- **REDEEM.** Interactive protocol run between some  $\mathcal{V}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$ , in which  $\mathcal{C}$  submits a certain amount of loyalty points to  $\mathcal{V}$  to obtain some benefits.

## 2.2 Desirable properties

We can state the following requirements for loyalty points and purchase receipts:

- **Correctness.** Loyalty points issued by a  $\mathcal{V}$  to a  $\mathcal{C}$  following the **ISSUE** protocol are accepted by the same  $\mathcal{V}$  running the **REDEEM** protocol. Similarly, purchase receipts given by  $\mathcal{V}$  to some  $\mathcal{C}$  during the **USE** protocol will be accepted by the same  $\mathcal{V}$  in the **SUBMIT** protocol, even if they have been generalized.
- **Unforgeability.** It should be impossible to any malicious customer or any coalition of malicious customers and vendors to forge new loyalty points or receipts issued by a vendor  $\mathcal{V}$ , regardless of how many original loyalty points or receipts they own from  $\mathcal{V}$ .
- **Anonymity.** Loyalty points and purchase receipts should be granted in an anonymous way. A vendor should be unable to learn anything about a customer redeeming points or submitting receipts, other than the customer legitimately owns them. This should hold even if the vendor colludes with other vendors or customers.
- **Controlled linkability.** A customer  $\mathcal{C}$  should be able to decide whether a submitted purchase receipt can be linked to other purchase receipts submitted by  $\mathcal{C}$  to the same vendor  $\mathcal{V}$ .

## 3 Anonymous tokens with controlled linkability

As stated in the previous section, loyalty points and purchase receipts have requirements in line with those of anonymous electronic cash and anonymous electronic credentials. These well-known technologies use blind signatures and/or zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge [3,4,6,14]. We will

treat points and receipts using a construction that we call anonymous tokens. These tokens will be realized by using partially blind signatures with some additional features.

### 3.1 Partially blind signatures

Blind signature protocols are interactive protocols between a requester and a signer, in which the signer produces a digital signature of a message submitted by the requester, but does not learn anything about the message content. This primitive was introduced by Chaum in [5] and has since been used in a vast array of privacy related protocols, such as e-cash, electronic voting and anonymous credential systems. An inherent drawback of blind signature protocols is that the signer cannot enforce a certain format on the message. Traditionally, this problem has been solved using *cut-and-choose* techniques, in which the requester of a signature generates and blinds a number  $n$  of messages, the signer asks the requester to unblind all messages but a randomly chosen one, checks whether all unblinded messages conform to the required format and, if yes, signs the only message that remains blinded. Using *cut-and-choose* techniques solves the problem (the probability that the requester succeeds in getting a non-conformant message signed is upper-bounded by  $1/n$ ), but it does so at the cost of high computation and communication overheads.

Partially blind signatures were introduced by Abe in [1] as an alternative to *cut-and-choose* protocols. In a partially blind signature protocol, the requester and the signer agree on a public information that is to be included in the signed message, the signer can be sure that such information is really included, and the requester can be sure that the signed message remains blinded to the signer.

We use a partially blind signature scheme from bilinear pairings presented in [18]. This scheme satisfies the requirements of completeness, partial blindness and unforgeability against one-more forgery under chosen message attacks, and thus it is considered secure. Security proofs can be found in the original paper. Additionally, this scheme produces short signatures, it is computationally efficient and allows aggregate verification of signed messages bearing the same agreed public information.

### 3.2 Controlled linkability of tokens

The use of partially blind signatures will ensure that a submitted token cannot be linked to an issued token, nor to the customer to whom it was

issued. However, if vendors are to be allowed to build customer profiles from anonymous purchase receipts, there must be a mechanism whereby, if allowed by the customer, the vendor can verify that several submitted purchase receipt tokens really correspond to the same (anonymous) customer, even if receipts have been generalized by the customer prior to submission. Note that if all (ungeneralized) purchase receipts from the same customer could be linked, customer anonymity would be problematic in spite of partially blind signatures: a very long and detailed profile is likely to be unique and goes a long way towards leaking the customer’s identity.

Thus, we propose a mechanism that allows customers to decide which purchase receipt tokens can be linked together, by employing an additional identifier as part of the secret message in the partially blind signature. This identifier is chosen by the customer for each receipt token at the moment of token issuance. If a customer picks a fresh random number for each issued purchase receipt, then none of this customer’s receipts will be linkable to each other; however, if the customer uses the same identifier for a group of purchase receipt tokens at the time of token issuance, then all of the tokens in this group can be verifiably linked together by the vendor after they are submitted.

### 3.3 Description

Anonymous tokens are operated in four phases:

- In the *setup* phase, a certification agency generates the public parameters of the partially blind signature scheme.
- In the *key generation* phase, users (*i.e.* vendors and customers) get their key pairs from the certification agency.
- In the *issuance* phase, a token corresponding to some loyalty points or to a purchase receipt is generated by a customer, it is signed in a partially blind way by a vendor and it is returned to the customer.
- Finally, in the *verification* phase, a customer submits previously generated tokens to a vendor, who in turn verifies that each token was correctly signed. If tokens correspond to purchase receipts, the vendor may verify whether the submitted tokens are linked with each other and/or with previously submitted tokens.

**Setup.** This algorithm is executed once by a certification authority to set up the system parameters. It takes as input a security parameter  $\lambda$ . The algorithm chooses bilinear groups  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_T)$  of order  $q > 2^\lambda$ , an efficiently

computable bilinear map  $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ , a generator  $g \in \mathbb{G}_1$  and collision-resistant hash functions  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and  $H_0 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ . The public parameters are  $\mathbf{pms} = \{\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_T, e, q, \lambda, g, H, H_0\}$ .

**Key generation.** A vendor gets a secret key  $sk_{\mathcal{V}} = x \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and a public key  $pk_{\mathcal{V}} = g^x$ , and publishes his public key.


**Token issuance.** A customer wants to obtain from a vendor a token with an agreed public information  $c$  (this information may specify a number of loyalty points or a purchase receipt for a certain product). This is an interactive protocol which produces a partially blind signature on public information  $c$ , and a secret message containing a unique identifier  $\alpha$  of the token and a (possibly) unique identifier  $y$ . The protocol is depicted in Figure 1 and described next:

1. The customer chooses a value for  $y$ , either from a list of previously used values or by generating a new one uniformly at random from  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ .
2. The customer and the vendor agree on a public string  $c \in \{0, 1\}^*$ .
3. The customer chooses random  $\alpha, r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and builds the message  $m = (\alpha, y)$ . Then, the customer blinds the message by computing  $u = H_0(c||m)^r$  and sends  $u$  to the vendor.
4. The vendor signs the blinded message by computing  $v = u^{(H(c)+sk_{\mathcal{V}})^{-1}}$  and sends it back to the customer.
5. The customer unblinds the signature by computing  $\sigma = v^{r^{-1}}$ . The resulting tuple  $T = \langle c, m, \sigma \rangle$  is the token.

An execution of this protocol, between a vendor  $\mathcal{V}$  and a customer  $\mathcal{C}$ , is denoted by  $T = \langle c, m, \sigma \rangle = \text{Issuance}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{C}, c, y)$ .

**Token verification.** The submission and verification of a token is an interactive protocol between a customer and a vendor. The customer submits the token  $T = \langle c, m, \sigma \rangle$  and the vendor returns **accept** or **reject** as a result of the verification. Informally, the vendor checks that the signature on the token is valid and has been produced by himself; then, if the value  $y$  contained in the message matches the one of a previously submitted token, the tokens are grouped. The protocol is outlined in Figure 2 and described next:

1. The customer sends  $T = \langle c, m, \sigma \rangle$  to the vendor.
2. The vendor parses the message  $m$  as  $(\alpha, y)$ .



**Fig. 1.** Token issuance protocol


3. The vendor verifies the signature by checking the equality

$$e(g^{H(c)} \cdot pk_{\mathcal{V}}, \sigma) \stackrel{?}{=} e(g, H_0(c||m)).$$

If the above equality holds, check whether the token has already been spent (verify whether a token with the same  $\alpha$  has previously been submitted). If the verification was successful and the token has not been spent yet, mark it as spent and send an **accept** message to the customer. Otherwise, send a **reject** message to the customer.

4. Finally, the vendor checks whether the identifier value  $y$  is the same as the one in a previously spent token. If yes, link the new token with that previous one.

An execution of this protocol involving a customer  $\mathcal{C}$ , a vendor  $\mathcal{V}$  and a token  $T$  is denoted as  $\text{accept/reject} = \text{Verification}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{C}, T)$ .



**Fig. 2.** Verification protocol

**Aggregate verification.** This protocol allows the customer to aggregate signatures of messages bearing the same public information by just multiplying the resulting signatures. If there is a list of tokens  $\{T_1, \dots, T_n\}$ , where  $T_i = \langle c_i, m_i, \sigma_i \rangle$ , and  $c_i = c$  for  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , a customer can aggregate the partially blind signatures by computing  $\sigma_{agg} = \prod_{i=1}^n \sigma_i$  and submitting  $T_{agg} = \langle c, \{m_1, \dots, m_n\}, \sigma_{agg} \rangle$ . The vendor can then verify the validity of the aggregated token by checking the equality

$$e(g^{H(c)} \cdot pk, \sigma_{agg}) \stackrel{?}{=} e(g, \prod H_0(c||m_i)).$$

### 3.4 Security analysis

The desirable security features that were described in Section 2.2 are satisfied by the above protocol suite, as argued below.

- **Correctness.** If the partially blind signature scheme is correctly computed, the verification equation will pass, because

$$\begin{aligned} e(g^{H(c)} \cdot pk, \sigma) &= e(g^{H(c)+x}, \sigma) \\ &= e(g^{H(c)+x}, v^{r^{-1}}) \\ &= e(g^{H(c)+x}, u^{(H(c)+x)^{-1} \cdot r^{-1}}) \\ &= e(g^{H(c)+x}, H_0(c||m)^{r \cdot r^{-1} \cdot (H(c)+x)^{-1}}) \\ &= e(g, H_0(c||m)^{r \cdot r^{-1} \cdot (H(c)+x) \cdot (H(c)+x)^{-1}}) \\ &= e(g, H_0(c||m)). \end{aligned}$$

- **Unforgeability.** Unforgeability is provided by the partially blind signature scheme. The security proofs can be found in the original work in [18].
- **Anonymity.** No information on the user is obtained by a server during the protocol. Submitted tokens cannot be linked to issued tokens or to the identity of a requester or prover because of the *partial blindness* property of the signature scheme.
- **Controlled linkability.** When a token is issued, the identifying value  $y$  is only known to the customer who generated the token, due to the *partial blindness* of the signature. Hence, if two verified tokens contain the same identifying value  $y$ , there are two possibilities: i) both tokens were generated by the same customer, who re-used  $y$  to allow the vendor to link them; ii) the customer who generated one token leaked  $y$  to the customer who generated the other token. If the latter leakage is prevented by technical means or discouraged

with appropriate incentives (see discussion in Section 5.8 below), then two tokens containing the same  $y$  can be linked by the vendor as corresponding to the same customer.

## 4 Generalization of purchase histories

To implement our protocol, a vendor must use a publicly available taxonomy for the products he offers. This taxonomy  $\mathcal{T}$  is modeled as a tree, being its root node a generic identifier such as *Product*, and each leaf a specific product in the set of products  $P = \{p_1, \dots, p_n\}$  on sale. The inner nodes of the tree are the subsequent categories to which the products belong: the closer to the leaf nodes, the more specific categories are. A generalization function  $g : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$  returns the parent of a node. Applying the generalization function  $m$  times will be denoted as  $g^m$ . As an example, for the product  $p_i = \textit{Inception}$ , its generalizations might be  $g(p_i) = \textit{ActionMovie}$ ,  $g^2(p_i) = \textit{Movie}$ ,  $g^3(p_i) = \textit{DigitalMedia}$  and  $g^4(p_i) = \textit{Product}$ . For simplicity and ease of implementation, it is desirable that all leaves be at the same depth, that is, that the path from the root to any leaf be of the same length.

Customers in our loyalty program protocol will receive a list of anonymous tokens, each issued as described in the previous section, for every product they purchase. This list contains a receipt for the specific product and receipts for all of its generalizations in the path up to the root of the taxonomy (generalization path). When a customer decides to submit her purchase history, she chooses the level of generalization she wants for each purchase. Then the customer sends for each purchase the tokens in the purchase generalization path from the chosen generalization level up to the root of the taxonomy. Following the movie example above, a customer who wants to submit her purchase generalized to level 2 will submit the tokens *Movie*, *DigitalMedia* and *Product*. Forcing customers to send all tokens from the selected generalization level to the root prevents them from using tokens in the generalization path of a purchase to falsely claim other purchases.

## 5 Privacy-preserving loyalty program construction

Our proposed solution for privacy-preserving loyalty programs builds on the anonymous tokens we described in Section 3 and the generalization of purchase histories described in Section 4. As introduced in Section 2, our construction consists of the following protocols: SETUP, VENDORSETUP, ENROLL, USE, SUBMIT, ISSUE and REDEEM.

## 5.1 Setup

The setup phase is run by a certification authority to generate the public parameters  $\text{pms}$  of the anonymous token construction described in Section 3. The system parameters are made public to every  $\mathcal{V}$  offering loyalty programs and to every  $\mathcal{C}$  intending to participate in them.

## 5.2 VendorSetup

Each vendor  $\mathcal{V}$  publishes a product taxonomy  $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{V}}$  as described in Section 4. Then,  $\mathcal{V}$  obtains a key pair built as described in the key generation procedure in Section 3. Finally,  $\mathcal{V}$  publishes his public key.

## 5.3 Enroll

Customers obtain the public parameters of the system and some means to communicate with the system, namely a smartcard or a smartphone application. Furthermore, customers enrolling to a loyalty program from a particular vendor obtain the vendor's public key and his taxonomy of products. This step is not mandatory, but it allows customers to check that tokens issued by vendors are valid and purchase receipt generalizations are correct.

## 5.4 Use

A customer  $\mathcal{C}$  in a loyalty program offered by a vendor  $\mathcal{V}$  purchases a product, either at a physical or online store of  $\mathcal{V}$ . Note that, in the case of an online store,  $\mathcal{C}$  should use additional anonymization measures, such as anonymous Internet surfing, offered for example by Tor networks [16], anonymous shipping methods [10], and anonymous payment methods (*e.g.* [13,6,12] or simply prepaid scratch cards). The protocol is as follows:

1.  $\mathcal{C}$  sends to  $\mathcal{V}$  the name  $p_i$  of the product  $\mathcal{C}$  wants to buy.
2.  $\mathcal{C}$  chooses a value  $y$  to be used in the token issuance protocol, depending on her privacy preferences: if she wants the new purchase receipt to be linkable to previously obtained purchase receipts (linkability is incentivized as described in Section 5.8 below), she will re-use the same  $y$  that was used in those previous receipts; if she does not want this new purchase receipts to be linkable to previous receipts, she will pick a new random  $y \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ .

3. In order to produce purchase receipt tokens for product  $p_i$  and all its generalizations,  $\mathcal{V}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$  run the interactive protocol  $\text{Issuance}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, p_i, y)$ ,  $\text{Issuance}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, g(p_i), y)$ ,  $\text{Issuance}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, g^2(p_i), y)$ , etc. up to the root of the taxonomy. In this way,  $\mathcal{C}$  obtains as many purchase receipt tokens as the depth of  $p_i$  in  $\mathcal{V}$ 's taxonomy.

### 5.5 Submit

At any moment, a customer can submit a list of purchase receipts (or a generalized version of them) to the vendor and obtain loyalty points. To this end, for each purchased product in her claimed purchase history, the customer sends the receipt token corresponding the level of generalization she wishes. Additionally, for each product, she also submits all tokens from the selected generalization level up to the root of the taxonomy (to make sure tokens in the generalization path cannot be later used as independent purchase receipts). The submission of each token  $T_i$  is performed according to the  $\text{Verification}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, T_i)$  protocol described in Section 3.3.

### 5.6 Issue

To issue loyalty points, the vendor builds a message `info` that encodes an identifier of the vendor, the number of points this token is worth and an expiration date. Unlike for purchase receipts, the vendor has no legitimate interest in linking several tokens containing loyalty points; hence, the customer picks a fresh random  $y$  for each new loyalty points token she claims. Then the vendor and the customer run the interactive protocol  $\text{Issuance}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \text{info}, y)$ . The generated token contains the loyalty points issued to the customer.

To ensure that a loyalty points token submitted for redemption cannot be linked with an issued loyalty points token, the number of loyalty points associated to a single token should be limited to a small set of possible values, similar to the limited denominations of bank notes. There is an efficiency toll to be paid for this caution, as issuing a certain amount of loyalty points can require running the `Issuance` protocol several times (several tokens may be needed to reach the required amount).

### 5.7 Redeem

A participant  $\mathcal{C}$  who wants to redeem a loyalty points token  $T$  previously earned at a vendor  $\mathcal{V}$ 's in exchange for some benefits runs the interactive protocol  $\text{Verification}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, T)$ .

It is possible to simultaneously redeem several loyalty points tokens by using the aggregation of signatures described in Section 3.3.

### 5.8 Incentives related to purchase receipts submission

Vendors can establish strategies to incentivize or discourage certain customer behaviors:

- To encourage customers to use little or no purchase receipt generalization (and hence to renounce some of their privacy), the amount of loyalty points awarded per receipt token should depend on the chosen level of generalization: more loyalty points awarded to less generalized purchase receipts.
- If the customer submits unlinkable receipts, she should just get enough loyalty points to reward her as a returning customer. To encourage customers to allow linkage of purchase receipt tokens by the vendor (and hence customer profiling), a customer should get more loyalty points if she submits  $n_1 + n_2$  tokens with the same  $y$  value than if she submits  $n_1$  tokens with one  $y$  value and then  $n_2$  tokens with a different  $y$  value (*superlinear reward*). Furthermore, the vendor may require that the list of linkable receipt tokens for which reward is claimed correspond to purchases made within a certain time window (if linking purchases very distant in time is uninteresting for profiling).
- Two or more customers might be tempted to share their  $y$  values in order to submit a longer list of linkable receipts and thereafter share the superlinear number of loyalty points they would earn. As long the reward is only *slightly* superlinear, customer collusion is discouraged if the customer  $\mathcal{C}$  who submits the list of linkable tokens is required by  $\mathcal{V}$  to actually show all the actual linkable tokens (and not just a reference to them): colluders different from  $\mathcal{C}$  may not like to pay the privacy toll of disclosing their purchase receipts to  $\mathcal{C}$ .

## 6 Performance analysis

We count here the number of operations required by the **Issuance** and **Verification** protocols described in Section 3.

The **Issuance** protocol requires the computation by the vendor of 1 exponentiation in  $\mathbb{G}_1$ ; also, 1 hash, 1 addition and 1 inversion in  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ . The customer computes 2 exponentiations in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and 1 inversion in  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ . The **Verification** protocol requires the computation by the vendor of 1

exponentiation, 1 multiplication and 1 hash in  $\mathbb{G}_1$ ; also, 1 hash in  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and 2 pairings.

We used the jPBC library [8] to test times to compute each of the operations. We generated a symmetric pairing constructed on the curve  $y^2 = x^3 + x$  with characteristic a 512-bit prime and embedding degree 2, *i.e.*, the Type A pairings suggested in [11]. The order of  $\mathbb{G}_1$  over the curve is a prime of 160 bits, elements in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  are 512 bits long and elements in  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$  160 bits long.

With the above technology choices, a multiplication of points in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  takes 0.09 ms, an exponentiation in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  takes 17.2 ms, an exponentiation in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  (with precomputation) takes 2.48 ms, a pairing takes 20.8 ms, and a pairing (with precomputation) takes 10.76 ms.

## 7 Conclusions and future work

In our privacy-preserving alternative to traditional loyalty programs, the customers are granted the power to decide what private information they want to disclose, and how precise that information is. We have described a privacy-preserving protocol suite that still offers the two main features of loyalty programs: reward returning customers and make customer profiling possible.

Future research will involve hiding the  $y$  values to technically deter customer collusions in purchase receipt submission. Also, in the context of a Google Faculty Research Award that partially funds this work, we plan to implement our solution using smartphones on the customer's side and test a demonstrator to show its practical feasibility.

## Acknowledgments

We thank Dr Qiang Tang for useful discussions on an earlier version of this paper. The following funding sources are acknowledged: Google (Faculty Research Award to the second author), Government of Catalonia (ICREA Acadèmia Prize to the second author and grant 2014 SGR 537), Spanish Government (project TIN2011-27076-C03-01 "CO-PRIVACY"), European Commission (FP7 projects "DwB" and "Inter-Trust") and Templeton World Charity Foundation (grant TWCF0095/AB60 "Co-Utility"). The authors are with the UNESCO Chair in Data Privacy. The views in this paper are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Google, UNESCO or the Templeton World Charity Foundation.

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